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Two TRENDS IN THE REGULATION OF THE
PUBLIC CORPORATION
JAMES J. PARK*
The public corporation is being shaped by two major
trends moving in opposite directions. The first trend
involves increasing federal regulation of corporate
governance and has made it more costly to be a public
company. The second trend involves decreasing regulation
of the public offering and has reduced the costs for public
companies when they sell securities. This essay examines
the interaction between these two trends. Costs imposed by
governance requirements can be offset by reducing the cost
of public offerings. Or, the relationship may run the other
way. When lenient public offering rules increase the risk of
fraud, they can prompt greater governance regulation.
Examining the links between the two trends suggests that
access to the public offering is increasingly conditioned on
meeting uniform corporate governance standards. Though
governance reform may have its benefits, a danger of
increasing federal corporate governance regulation is
pressure to decrease protectionsfor investors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two major trends moving in opposite directions are defining the
regulation of the public corporation. The first trend involves increasing
federal regulation of corporate governance. Spurred in part by the collapse
of a number of prominent public companies, the securities laws have been
used to require public companies to adopt uniform governance measures.
The second trend involves reduced regulation of the public offering. Over
the last several decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has relaxed regulation of companies, especially large public ones, when
raising funds through public offerings. The first trend has increased the
costs of being a public company while the second trend has reduced the
costs for public companies when they sell securities.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This essay is based on the
keynote speech given at a symposium, Repair or Replace: Lifting SEC Regulation
from Patchwork to Permanence, sponsored by the Ohio State Entrepreneurial
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As a result of these trends, the gap between public and private
companies has grown larger.1 Only companies with significant resources
can easily meet the governance obligations that have been imposed through
the federal securities laws. Only companies that meet federal governance
obligations are permitted to access funds through the public markets.
Smaller companies are finding it less viable to be public companies because
of higher governance costs, and they are limited to selling securities
through exempt offerings.
The tendency of the securities regulation scholarship over the years has
been to look at each of these trends in isolation. Some have criticized the
2increasing governance costs imposed on public corporations, while others
have defended the role of the securities laws in supplementing what they
see as lax state regulation of corporate governance.3 Separately, there has
long been debate about whether the federal law governing offerings should
be relaxed in various ways to make it less costly for companies to raise
funds by selling securities to investors.4
The motivating idea behind this essay is that it may be fruitful to
examine the relationship between these two trends. Though the securities
laws traditionally were thought of as regulating disclosure, governance has
become enough of a part of securities regulation such that it can be said that
governance costs and public offering costs are two facets of one regulatory
system. Regulators might manage the overall burdens of the system through
1 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES 59 (2006) ("In our view, public
companies today must be more mature and sophisticated, have a more substantial
administrative infrastructure and expend substantially more resources simply to
comply with the increased securities regulatory burden." (footnote omitted));
Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction ofSarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1817, 1820 (2007) ("[The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's] most important effects may
be less about investor protection than about renegotiating the boundary between the
public and private spaces in big corporations, a much deeper ideological issue.").
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round I, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Roberta S. Karmel,
Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange
Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79
(2005); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
3 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Fifth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: The New
Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1993); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REv. 859 (2003).
4 See, e.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BuS. LAW. 919
(2011); Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85 (2006).
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calibration of these two types of costs. For example, companies can be
encouraged to go public despite the resulting governance costs by lowering
public offering costs. Or, the relationship might run the other way. Laws
imposing governance regulation can be understood in part as a response to
liberalization of the regulation of public offerings. More lenient offering
rules resulted in a greater risk of fraud, necessitating additional governance
measures. The two trends in the regulation of the public corporation have
resulted in a system where the right to do a public offering is being
conditioned on meeting certain governance obligations.
Admittedly, there are dangers to linking governance and public offering
costs. Thinking of these two types of costs as somewhat interchangeable
could justify unwise federal preemption of state corporate law. It might be
easier to justify ratcheting up governance regulation if reductions in public
offering regulation can mitigate the costs of governance. It would be more
optimal to look at each area of regulation separately and impose the right
level of regulation in each area. However, given the pressure to improve the
governance of public companies, it is likely that reform proposals will
continue to be implemented, and the question will be how regulators can
manage the burdens of governance.
Moreover, thinking of governance and public offering regulation as part
of one system suggests that there is an upper limit to which the federal
securities laws can be used to impose uniform corporate governance
standards on public corporations. At some point, it will not be possible to
reduce offering costs to counter increasing governance costs without
significantly compromising the investor protection and market efficiency
goals of the federal securities laws. Indeed, there are signs that the recent
push to increase governance obligations has resulted in legislation that will
harm investors. It may be that governance rules are already becoming too
burdensome, and that resulting reductions in offering regulation may affect
the ability of the securities laws to perform their core function.
This essay has four parts. Part I describes the trend towards using the
federal securities laws to regulate corporate governance. Part III describes
the SEC's efforts to reduce public offering costs. Part IV discusses the
relationship between these two trends and suggests that governance is
increasingly a condition of accessing the public offering. Part V discusses
some of the arguments against linking governance and offering costs, and
notes that a risk of increasing governance regulation is it can result in
pressure for legislation that erodes protections for investors.
II. INCREASING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTS
In the United States, corporate governance has traditionally been
regulated by state law. While the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws have long touched on areas of corporate governance, in the
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last decade or so federal law has been more aggressively extended to
regulate corporate governance. Part of the push has been a reaction to
scandals at public companies. Another factor is greater activism by
shareholders. These developments have increased the costs of being a
public corporation and it is likely that the costs will continue to increase.
A. Governance and Public Corporations
To the extent that corporate governance is a way of managing agency
costs, one would expect that public corporations will naturally have greater
governance obligations. Public corporations have more shareholders than
private corporations. The greater the number of shareholders, the greater are
the costs of agency. Rather than serving two or three masters, the managers
of a public corporation serve thousands of owners-increasing the potential
for divergence of interests between principals and agents. Thus, corporate
law has long distinguished between public and closely held corporations.
Shareholders of public corporations are owed fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty by the board of directors and managers of the corporation. In
contrast, shareholders of closely held corporations are owed a smaller range
of duties in some states and virtually no duties in states such as Delaware.5
Public corporations face greater disclosure obligations under the
securities laws than do private companies. Public corporations must file
disclosures when they sell securities to the public, as well as periodic
disclosures on a quarterly and yearly basis. One simple reason for this
differing treatment is that public companies have more investors who could
be defrauded than do private companies. Public investors have less
interaction with the managers of the company than do private investors, and
so have less direct information about the company than investors in a
closely held corporation. Disclosure remedies this asymmetry of
information.
The core disclosure obligations of the securities laws touch on issues of
corporate governance.6 The federal securities laws require managers of the
corporation to set up reliable internal controls to organize and manage
5 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
6 See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1148-49 (1965) ("Because disclosure is designed to provide
investors with the data necessary to make informed judgments, the information
required may encompass all aspects of corporate life, and consequently all aspects
of corporate life may be affected." (footnote omitted)); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil
Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, Wis. L. REv. 297,
310-12 (2009) (describing role of disclosure in improving corporate governance).
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information.' Given the complexity of the modem public corporation,
adequate disclosure is only possible if procedures are in place to verify the
accuracy of such disclosure. Reliable information is not just a concern for
securities regulation, but also for corporate governance. Without accurate
disclosures, it is difficult for the board to assess the performance of the
corporation and its managers. Indeed, corporate law has recognized that a
board's reckless failure to adequately monitor the corporation can violate
the duty of care.8 The internal controls mandated by the federal securities
laws help ensure that the information boards use to monitor and govern the
corporation is reliable.9
The federal securities laws provide for enforcement mechanisms
relating to disclosure that touch on corporate governance issues. The anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws punish managers who make false
disclosures to enrich themselves, 0 enforcing a substantive norm similar to
the corporate law duty of loyalty. To the extent that a fraud is the result of
reckless conduct by managers, a federal securities claim will touch on the
corporate law duty of care.
In addition to the federal securities laws and state corporate law,
exchanges regulate the governance of public companies seeking a liquid
market for their shares. In order for its stock to be traded on an exchange, a
company must meet listing standards that measure whether it is suitable for
public trading. Though exchanges are technically not government
institutions, they are heavily regulated by the SEC and have adopted
suggestions by the SEC to implement regulations increasing governance
obligations." For example, at the prompting of the SEC, the exchanges
have required listed companies to have boards with a majority of
independent directors. 12 To the extent that an exchange listing is critical in
creating a liquid market for a company's securities, a public corporation
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006), amended by
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
8 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
9 The federal securities laws also regulate corporate voting. Because most
shareholders do not attend the corporation's meetings, they must vote through
proxy. Public companies typically circulate a proxy statement containing
information relevant to the matters that will be voted upon at the meeting. Federal
securities law requires that these proxies not be misleading. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 14(e). To the extent that shareholders participate in governing the
corporation, their participation in governance is shaped by the federal proxy laws.
10 See James J. Park, Rule lob-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle,
60 DuKE L.J. 345, 385 (2010).
" See Self-Regulatory Organizations, NYSE, Inc. and NASDAQ, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange
Act Release No.48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,157 (Nov. 12, 2003).
12 See id. at 64,157.
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will have to consent to such governance measures. Because exchange
regulation is technically separate from the disclosure regime of the federal
securities laws, it is a way of imposing corporate governance reforms on the
largest public companies without amending the core securities laws.
It should not be a surprise that public corporations are held to higher
governance standards. Corporate law, federal securities law and exchange
listing standards all require more of public companies. The questions are
whether governance obligations should be increased, and whether the
federal securities laws should play a greater role in defining such
obligations.
B. Governance and Scandal
As a number of commentators have noted, increasing regulation of
corporate governance by the federal securities laws has been prompted by
major scandals and economic turmoil. 13 Such events prompt legislatures to
pass laws that aspire to improve governance of public corporations and
prevent scandals in the future. Three of the major laws that have increased
the role of the federal securities laws in corporate governance-the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 14 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley), 15 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank)' 6-- fit this pattern.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a response to the discovery in
the 1970s by investigations growing out of the Watergate political scandal
that large public companies were routinely paying bribes while doing
business overseas. The SEC brought a number of controversial actions
alleging that the failure to disclose these bribes violated the securities
laws.' 7 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act imposed federal requirements on
public companies to maintain adequate internal controls and accurate books
and records, while also prohibiting bribery. 18 The law essentially used the
securities regulation principle of full and accurate disclosure to impose a
type of anti-corruption norm on public companies. In doing so, it sent the
message that disclosure not only serves to protect investors and facilitate
13 See sources cited supra note 2.
'4 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-3 (2006).
'" Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
16 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Il1-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
17 See generally ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982)
(describing enforcement actions relating to overseas bribes).
18 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 102-103.
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efficient markets, but also helps ensure that transparency will check the
ability of public corporations to act unethically.
In 2002, years after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Sarbanes-Oxley
was passed in the wake of the sudden collapse of two large, prominent,
public companies: Enron and WorldCom. Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley
extended the force of a public company's internal controls obligations by
requiring the company's management to assess the adequacy of those
controls and the company's auditors to attest to that assessment.'9 Under
that law, the company's CEO and CFO must certify that the company's
periodic reports contain no material misstatements and fairly present the
financial condition of the issuer.20 Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits public
companies from extending loans to its managers,2' while also requiring that
audit committees of public companies be composed of independent
22directors. In addition to regulating areas traditionally the subject of state
corporate law, such as board composition and decision-making, Sarbanes-
Oxley increased the cost of internal controls by formalizing the process by
which such controls would be documented and assessed, making the public
corporation more bureaucratic in its governance.
Dodd-Frank was passed after the collapse of major financial institutions
during the economic crisis of 2008, which was triggered largely by the
collapse of the housing market. Corporate governance problems such as
excessive executive pay were seen as creating incentives that resulted in
unreasonable risk-taking. Dodd-Frank thus includes governance measures
related to executive compensation that are to be implemented through the
securities laws. One such provision, the so-called "Say on Pay" law,
requires advisory shareholder votes on the company's executive
compensation policies. 23 Another Dodd-Frank provision requires that for
public companies listed on exchanges, the board committee setting
24
executive compensation be composed of independent directors.
The link between federal corporate governance reform and scandal has
resulted in questions about the quality of deliberation with respect to such
reform.25 Costs of greater corporate governance obligations can be difficult
19 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.2 1 Id § 302.
21 Id. § 402.
22 Id. § 301.
23 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
24Id. § 952.
25 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1833-34 (2006) (noting
problems with reactive approach to corporate law making). The problems
associated with crisis-driven lawmaking have long been acknowledged. See Louis
Loss, Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation, 45 VA. L. REV. 787, 789
436 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
to predict, and in the heat of the moment there can be a tendency to
underestimate the burdens of regulation. Indeed, the costs of Sarbanes-
Oxley have been much higher than anticipated, reducing the legitimacy of
the law.26 While governance costs are felt immediately, the benefits of
corporate governance regulation are difficult to measure. Even when there
are long-term benefits to governance legislation, such benefits are often
overshadowed by the perception that such laws are too burdensome. The
result might be that companies that would otherwise be public might
believe it is in their best interest to remain private.
While major governance legislation is often passed after a financial
crisis, it is important to recognize that the push for reform is not just driven
by the aftermath of economic bubbles. Prominent commentators have
proposed federal governance reforms because of long-standing concerns
relating to the governance of public corporations.27 Shareholders have
become more sophisticated and active, and have been another impetus for
reform. The tension between shareholders and managers may always ensure
that corporate governance reform could be put on the agenda. The federal
securities laws are a mechanism that can be used to impose uniform
governance regulation, and for various reasons, such reforms have been
suggested and implemented.
III. REDUCING PUBLIC OFFERING COSTS
As the securities laws have increasingly regulated governance of public
companies, they have become more liberal in their regulation of the public
offering. The ability to offer securities to the public is what primarily
distinguishes public from private corporations. Though companies may also
sell securities through exemptions to the securities laws, there are still
major advantages to doing a public offering. However, public offerings can
be costly,28 and over the last forty years, efforts have been made to reduce
the expense of this process for various reasons.
(1959) ("But the fact must be recognized that technical legislation of the SEC kind
seems to come only in times of crises, when ... in order to take care of
everybody's objections, it is apt to be either exceedingly complex or exceedingly
wishy-washy or both.").26 See generally Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?,
26 YALE J. ON REG. 229 (2009) (documenting negative media response to
Sarbanes-Oxley).27 See, e.g., Bebchuck & Hamdani, supra note 25.
28 The costs of offerings, even by established public companies, can be substantial.
See John J. Moon, Public vs. Private Equity, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 76, 76
(2006) ("The fees paid to underwriters, auditors, attorneys, and other intermediaries
typically run from 3% to 5% of the gross proceeds of an offering for an already
public company, depending on the size of the issuance among other factors.").
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The baseline for public offerings is the initial public offering, where a
company sells equity to the public for the first time. In such an offering, the
need for extensive new disclosure is apparent because the company has no
public history. The expense of extensive disclosure efforts is justified
because valuation of new companies is difficult, and there are concerns that
the promoters of the company are taking advantage of investors. Because
stock only has value if the company is profitable or will be profitable,
investors need special protection-which the securities regulations provide.
As public companies mature, however, they begin to develop a history
of disclosures. Secondary markets of publicly traded stocks are constantly
monitoring these disclosures and incorporating new information about the
company. To the extent that companies issue additional securities over
time, there may not be as great of a need to subject a company to the same
scrutiny as when it was a new public company. Subsequent offerings by
public companies, especially large ones, need not trigger the same extensive
regulation as an initial public offering.
To take into account the difference between new and seasoned public
companies, the first step in the liberalization of the public offering was the
integration of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,
which governs public offerings, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which requires public companies to make periodic disclosures. Until
integration, each of these statutes imposed different rules for disclosure.
Integration simplified the process by setting forth one set of regulations
governing the filings under either Act.29
With integration, it became possible to streamline the public offering
process. 30 Rather than prepare a new set of disclosures for each offering,
established companies that were already filing periodic disclosures could
simply refer to those disclosure documents when selling securities. 31 In an
efficient market, preparing new offering documents is unnecessary because
the market will already have incorporated the information from the periodic
disclosures. By reducing redundancies in disclosure requirements,
integration resulted in significant savings for established public companies.
Integration allowed for shelf registration, which permits certain public
companies to quickly sell securities at a time of their choosing.32 A
company can register securities, obtain approval from the SEC and actually
29 With integration, one regulation, Regulation S-K, governs both Securities Act
and Securities Exchange Act disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2012).
30 For an overview of the rationale for integrated disclosure and shelf offerings, see
Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135 (1984).
31 Certain companies can utilize an S-3 short form registration form. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.13 (2012).
32 SEC Rule 415 allows for shelf registrations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2012).
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sell the securities months or years later when market conditions are optimal.
Rather than prepare a new registration statement for the later shelf offering,
the company can simply incorporate by reference its periodic disclosures.33
A 1985 study by Sanjai Bhagat, M. Wayne Marr and G. Rodney
Thompson found significant cost savings for shelf registrations.34 They
estimated that shelf registrations cost 13% less for syndicated equity
offerings, translating into a savings of $370,000 for the average $58.8
million stock issue in their sample.35 Public companies now routinely offer
billions of dollars in debt through shelf offerings,36 and even if the savings
are not as high as for equity offerings in the mid-80s, it is likely that shelf
offerings have resulted in significant savings for public companies
permitted to make such offerings.
Though it reduces offering costs, shelf registration also undermines the
ability of underwriters to scrutinize public companies each time they offer
securities to the public.37 Because the actual sale of securities occurs
months after the filing of the registration statement, and takes a matter of
days to complete, the due diligence process that is typical for the initial
public offering of securities is shortened. 3 As a result, it is more difficult
for the underwriter to root out fraudulent offerings. With shelf offerings, the
detection of fraud has been delegated from underwriters to the markets and
their participants. Efforts to decrease public offering costs have thus
reduced the ability of securities regulation to check poor corporate
governance.
The offering process has been further liberalized post-Sarbanes-Oxley.
The 2005 Offering Reforms were the culmination of earlier efforts to
33 Allowing shelf registrations helped U.S. markets compete with Eurodollar
markets where companies could tap funds without the burdens of U.S. regulation.
See Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters
Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 755, 793 (1981).
34 Sanjai Bhagat, M. Wayne Marr & G. Rodney Thompson, The Rule 415
Experiment: Equity Markets, 40 J. FIN. 1385, 1400 (1985).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Beth Selby, The Twilight of the Syndicate, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Aug. 1985, at 205, 206 (noting that General Motors had underwriting fees of $2.2
million for a $250 million debt offering in 1972, and underwriting fees of $900,000
for a $250 million debt offering in 1985).
37 For a description of this problem, see Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence
Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters' Continuous Due Diligence After
WorldCom, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 2001, 2018-20 (2009).38 id.
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streamline the offering process.39 These reforms made it easier to comply
with the gun-jumping rules, which regulate communications during the
offering process, by creating a number of bright-line safe harbors for certain
communications and allowing for the use of a wider range of written
materials to market offerings to investors. 40 The SEC also created a new
category of issuer, the Well-Known Seasoned Issuer (WKSI), which can go
forward with a shelf offering without SEC review of the registration
statement.41 The largest public companies qualify as WKSIs, reducing the
cost of public offerings for those companies. The reforms also essentially
did away with the requirement to deliver a final prospectus to investors for
most offerings. 2 The reforms were seen as a positive development for
issuers by at least one law firm, which declared after their passage: "Santa
Claus came early this year for the securities industry.3
Two years after Dodd-Frank, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act) was passed to reduce costs for smaller companies that are
raising funds from public investors.44 In addition to a number of other
changes to the securities laws,45 the JOBS Act exempts companies with
under $1 billion in annual revenue from some of the requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank for five years after they go public. 46 In
particular, such "emerging growth companies" are not subject to section
404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for five years,47 are not subject to
mandatory audit firm rotation for five years,48 are not subject to certain
executive compensation disclosures imposed by Dodd-Frank for five
years49 and are permitted to submit draft registration statements to the SEC
for review prior to an offering.50
39 See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005).40 Id. at 44,735-41.
41 Id. at 44,726-30.
42 Id. at 44,782-86.
43 BRIAN G. CARTWRIGHT ET AL., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CHRISTMAS IN JULY-
THE SEC IMPROVES THE SECURITIES OFFERING PROCESS 1 (2005).
44 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act pmbl., Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
45 For example, the JOBS Act created a crowdfunding exemption. Id. § 302. For a
description of the crowdfunding market, see Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden
Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of
1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 880-972 (2011).
46 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § § 101-05.47 Id. § 103.48 Id. § 104.49 Id. § 102.
50Id. § 105.
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In sum, the SEC and Congress have made efforts to reduce public
offering costs. As a general matter, these developments have received less
attention than the use of the federal securities laws to regulate corporate
governance. Over the years, these reforms have likely made it more
attractive to be a public company, especially a large one.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND
PUBLIC OFFERINGS
While they are motivated in part by different policy considerations, the
recent trends of increasing governance costs and decreasing offering costs
both occur within the legal framework of securities regulation. Rather than
view each development as unrelated, this Part argues that there are links
between these two trends. To the extent that governance obligations of
public corporations are increasing, those costs might be offset in part by
reducing offering costs. Or, the relationship might run the other way.
Efforts to liberalize offerings may have affected the ability of the securities
laws to monitor fraud, prompting an increase in governance requirements.
Finally, this Part notes that governance is increasingly a condition to taking
advantage of public offerings.
A. Reducing Offering Costs to Mitigate Higher Governance Costs
One response to higher governance costs for public companies would
be to repeal the legislation imposing such costs. Another possibility might
be to modify such laws to exempt certain companies, such as small or
foreign companies. If repeal or modification is politically unfeasible or
undesirable, a policymaker can restore some balance to the system by
cutting regulatory burdens in another area.5' Reducing offering costs could
offset some of the increased costs imposed by governance reform and
increase the incentive to become a public company.
In an article written prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank, John Coates made a related point. He observed that the SEC can act
as a "circuit breaker" that can moderate legislation passed during a financial
crisis. He noted that "[o]ver and over again, the SEC has functioned not
only to regulate, but also to keep in check political tendencies to
51 See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global
Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1067, 1072 (2008) ("[R]egulators may also
choose not to reform unattractive corporate rules per se, but instead to make their
securities regulations more competitive and thereby lower the net costs of issuer
compliance.").
52 See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 555-56 (2001).
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legislate. 53 At least some of the efforts to liberalize offerings after
Sarbanes-Oxley are examples of the SEC trying to mitigate the effects of
governance reform passed after periods of financial turmoil. Indeed, with
the JOBS Act, Congress itself has acted to reduce some of the costs that it
earlier imposed on public companies.
There is evidence that the 2005 Offering Reforms and JOBS Act were
in part spurred by the effects of governance reform. Some practitioners
speculated that the 2005 Offering Reforms were motivated by a desire to
make U.S. securities markets more attractive for foreign issuers after
Sarbanes-Oxley.54 The JOBS Act is even more obviously directed at
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank costs by exempting emerging growth
companies, firms with under $1 billion in earnings, from some of the
requirements of those statutes for five years.55
In a sense, the 2005 Offering Reforms and JOBS Act have moved the
securities laws in the opposite direction of corporate governance reform.
While governance is meant to protect shareholders from abuse by
managers, offering reform to some extent accepts compromises in investor
protection to make access to the capital markets less costly. Companies that
are considering going public will weigh the burdens of governance against
the benefits of the ability to do public offerings. By making it less
burdensome to do public offerings, regulators can make the prospect of
becoming a public company attractive.
At least some of the governance costs of Sarbanes-Oxley have been
offset by offering savings from the 2005 Offering Reforms and the JOBS
Act. A 2009 study by the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis estimated
that the expense of section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley for public companies
averages $2.03 million with a median cost of $1.04 million per year.56 The
cost-savings of the 2005 Offering Reforms have not been studied in as
much depth. Indeed, it is difficult to measure precisely how much is saved
by the creation of the WKSI category and bright-line offering rules.
Certainly, though, these provisions create greater legal certainty that will
facilitate public offerings.57 One estimate prepared by the SEC predicted
53 Id. at 557.
54 See Leslie N. Silverman & Jeffrey D. Karpf, The SEC's Securities Offering
Reform Proposals: Will This Ship Sail?, 38 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 63, 64
(2005) ("The SEC's proposals are also motivated by its strong interest in attracting
a greater volume of transactions to the U.S. public market through registration.").
55 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 103-04, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).56 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 5
(2009) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002].
57 It is also important to acknowledge that section 404 has benefits that would
offset its costs. Though it is difficult to quantify those benefits, it is likely that there
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that the 2005 Offering Reforms will save $130 million per year, a small but
not trivial amount. 8 Such a level of savings would offset the annual section
404 costs for about sixty-five public companies. The JOBS Act is also
likely to result in some governance savings for smaller companies, at least
for the first five years of their existence.
Regardless of whether the reduction of costs from offering reform
significantly offsets the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley,5 9 looking at the two trends
together suggests a strategy for mitigating governance costs. The SEC can
find ways to reduce regulations in other areas for public companies and in
doing so can lessen the overall costs imposed on public companies by the
federal securities laws. Indeed, it is likely that some of the recent offering
reforms are at least partly explained by a desire to mitigate the increasing
burdens of governance on public corporations.
B. Increasing Governance Regulation to Offset the Effects of Lower
Offering Regulation
Another possible relationship between governance and offering
regulation is that greater governance obligations are necessitated when
offering reform increases the risk of fraud in public companies. The effort
to reduce offering costs over the last several decades has made it more
difficult for gatekeepers to do due diligence on public companies when they
periodically offer securities. At least one governance measure, section 404
of Sarbanes-Oxley, is best understood as a way of improving continious
monitoring of the periodic disclosures of public companies.
In a classic article on the puzzle of why companies pay dividends to
shareholders, Frank Easterbrook highlighted the importance of public
offerings in monitoring public companies. 60 Easterbrook argued that
dividends might check agency costs because companies have to go to the
capital markets to fund a dividend.6' With each new securities offering,
underwriters scrutinize the company in assessing the accuracy of the
are significant benefits in improved transparency and more accurate disclosures.
See STUDY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, supra note 56, at 6-8.58 Securities Offering Reform, supra note 39, at 44,794-95.
59 Some commentators are skeptical that offering reform significantly offsets
governance costs. See, e.g., Silverman & Karpf, supra note 54, at 83 ("Although
some foreign private issuers may view the benefits of WKSI status, in particular the
immediate access to U.S. capital once they become seasoned, as outweighing the
burdens imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is unlikely that this will be the case
for many foreign private issuers.").
60 Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REv. 650, 653-54 (1984).61 Id. at 656.
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disclosures relating to the offering.62 At the time Easterbrook wrote the
article, public offerings were more time-consuming and expensive. The
benefit of such costs was meaningful due diligence of public companies by
market gatekeepers.
With the common use of shelf offerings, the premise behind
Easterbrook's argument is no longer as valid. Now, established public
companies can initiate and complete offerings within a matter of days.
Underwriters do not have as much time to scrutinize the accuracy of
disclosures relating to the offering. Indeed, the disclosure for a shelf
offering just incorporates by reference periodic disclosures that the
underwriter did not participate in drafting. Though shelf offerings are
desirable in that they make it less costly for public companies to access
securities markets, with shelf offerings, there is less meaningful monitoring
of public companies through the underwriting process.63
As the SEC reduces regulation of securities offerings, the risk of fraud
may increase. The collapse of WorldCom, which helped spur passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, raised issues concerning the ability of underwriters to
detect fraud relating to securities offerings by seasoned issuers. While
publishing fraudulent financial statements, WorldCom was able to offer
billions of dollars in bonds to public investors. Those investors lost much of
their investment when the company suddenly collapsed and went into
bankruptcy after the accounting fraud was discovered. In litigation relating
to these offerings, the underwriters asserted a due diligence defense,
arguing that they had relied upon prior work done by auditors and could not
have discovered the fraud. A federal district court rejected this argument,
finding that the underwriters had an obligation to follow up on red flags
relating to WorldCom's financial results, and refused to dismiss the case on
summary judgment.64 The underwriters settled the case for billions of
dollars rather than risking trial.65
62 Id. at 654 ("The principal value of keeping firms constantly in the market for
capital is that the contributors of capital are very good monitors of managers.").
63 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The
Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143, 1170
(1995) ("Perhaps irretrievably, underwriters have lost their role as reputational
intermediaries in shelf registrations."); Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and
Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 284 (2009) (noting that the
Securities Act liability system "worked well in the past to produce high-quality
disclosure, before short form and shelf registration made serious underwriter due
diligence for offerings by established issuers impractical.").
64 In re WorldCom, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 674-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). For a
thoughtful critique of the decision, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Diligence After
WorldCom, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 20, 2005, at 17.
65 Gretchen Morgenson, Bank to Pay $2 Billion to Settle WorldCom Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005.
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There are links between section 404 and the problems highlighted by
WorldCom.66 Section 404's requirement that auditors assess the company's
internal controls is essentially a due diligence obligation. Section 404
requires additional scrutiny of the generative process for the most important
item in a company's disclosures, the financial statements.67 Auditors are in
a better position than underwriters of shelf offerings to determine whether a
public company's controls are able to detect fraud. Though auditors already
performed annual audits prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, section
404 formally requires greater assessment of internal controls in conjunction
with the company's management.
If auditors are doing more to scrutinize internal controls after Sarbanes-
Oxley, the liability of underwriters for misstatements relating to shelf
offerings might be more manageable. Auditors will catch more frauds that
could lead to underwriter liability for a shelf offering, reducing the risk of a
section 11 suit for both auditors and underwriters. Indeed, despite the high
standard for due diligence set forth in WorldCom, a case could be made that
the standard for underwriter due diligence should be lessened in light of
section 404. With section 404, underwriters should be able to argue that
they have greater reason to rely on the expert determinations of these.
auditors with respect to the adequacy of internal controls. An underwriter
facing liability in a section 11 suit for a shelf offering where there is
accounting fraud might point to the auditor's section 404 certification as
providing the underwriter with reasonable assurance as to the validity of the
company's financial statements.
Section 404 certainly increases governance costs borne by the issuer
and potentially by auditors who might be held liable for a failure to find
fraud. An auditor might be compensated for this increased potential liability
through higher fees earned by doing section 404 assessments and
66 Indeed, prior to WorldCom and Sarbanes-Oxley, Donald Langevoort proposed
that greater scrutiny of internal controls might be a way to improve the monitoring
of shelf registrations, though he would have accompanied such controls with less
exposure to fraud on the market liability for issuers. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure
Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 47 (2000) ("I would, however,
create a much more determinate obligation on the part of seasoned issuers to
implement an efficient disclosure monitoring system, an elaboration of the current
obligation to have a reasonable system of internal controls found in Section
13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act ... ").
67 The WorldCom fraud was facilitated by the lack of adequate internal controls.
See RICHARD C. BREEDON, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S.
RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI 15 (2003)
("[T]he Company's internal controls over the preparation and publication of its
financial results were dysfunctional at best, and in some areas controls were
missing entirely.").
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certifications. Part of the greater costs of Sarbanes-Oxley can be understood
as a subsidy to the auditing industry, increasing the resources auditors have
to monitor companies. The question for issuers is whether the costs of
section 404 are offset by the savings they receive from the ability to do
shelf offerings and the greater trust investors will have in the financial
statements of those public companies.
Linking section 404 to the problem of shelf offerings suggests a natural
limit to its application to public companies. If section 404 is understood as a
method of continuous due diligence, it might be limited to companies
qualifying to do shelf offerings. Another possibility is that section 404
could be limited to the largest companies, the WKSIs, that can do offerings
without approval of the SEC. For WKSIs, significant fraud has greater
social consequences, and the need for monitoring is more likely worth the
cost. Regardless of where the line is drawn, as has been noted before,
examining the relationship between governance and offerings shows that
section 404 makes the most sense for larger public companies that are
permitted to do offerings on short notice.
Some of the governance rules Congress imposed through Sarbanes-
Oxley were in part prompted by problems created by earlier offering
reforms. Lenient regulation in one area may have indirectly resulted in
greater regulation in another area.
C. Governance as a Condition to Being Public
The increasing use of the securities laws to impose corporate
governance requirements can also be understood as making a normative
point. Higher levels of governance are the cost of easier access to the public
markets.68 For better or worse, the securities laws are no longer limited to
promoting full and fair disclosure, but are increasingly playing a more
substantive sorting role with respect to what companies should be public.
Recent reforms have been driven by a complex set of interacting
considerations. Offering reforms contributed to frauds that prompted
governance reform. As governance reform becomes burdensome, regulators
respond by implementing additional offering reforms to offset the costs of
governance requirements. Regardless of how the costs ultimately balance
out, governance and its costs have become a persistent presence in
securities regulation.
68 This point is not a new one. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market
Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 707, 735 (2005) (noting position of former chief accountant
for the SEC that disclosure standards are "part of the price of being a public
company. If you don't want to pay the price, go private.").
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The distinction between public and private companies rests on the view
69that public companies are in some way different than private companies.
The failure of a public company generally impacts more investors than the
failure of a private company. The collapse of large public companies such
as Enron and WorldCom had a societal impact that shook faith in public
markets, and harmed numerous stakeholders in those corporations. Whether
or not better governance could have prevented such events, efforts at
governance reform reflect the view that public companies should be held to
higher standards because of their importance.
The trend towards conditioning access to the public markets on higher
levels of governance raises questions about whether smaller companies
should be encouraged to be public. Larger companies can easily afford
governance costs, but entrepreneurial companies often do not have the
resources to invest in governance. As described by a number of
commentators, the costs of widening the gap between public and private
companies are numerous. 7° Smaller companies will have to find sources
other than public markets to raise capital. Investors will not have as many
opportunities to invest in promising companies. Innovation that comes from
a vibrant market for small companies will be stifled.
It is likely that securities regulation will continue differentiating
between types of companies and their access to the markets. As described
earlier, the JOBS Act is an effort to carve out alternative avenues for
smaller companies so they can raise capital without taking on greater
governance obligations, at least for a transitional period. As they deal with
competing policy considerations, securities regulators will have to make
adjustments to both governance and offering requirements in a way that
balances the multiple concerns that are shaping the distinction between
private and public companies.
V. LINKING GOVERNANCE COSTS AND OFFERING COSTS
If regulators are using offering reform to offset the costs imposed by
governance reform and vice-versa, the question is whether this relationship
should continue, or whether it should be discouraged. Despite the appeal of
calibrating securities regulation by matching increased regulation in one
69 For a recent articulation of this view, see Hillary A. Sale, The New "Public"
Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011). For a more skeptical view
of the distinctiveness of public companies, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS
Act, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (noting that most public companies do not have
the footprint of companies such as Enron and WorldCom).
70 Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC's Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUs. 1,
7-10 (2007).
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area with reduced regulation in another, there are dangers to linking
governance and offerings. An argument could be made that we should
primarily look at each area independently in assessing whether regulation is
warranted or unwarranted.
An obvious problem with the contention that reductions in offering
costs can counteract higher governance costs is that such costs are difficult
to measure and compare. There is not enough evidence to conclude that
offering reforms have resulted in savings that significantly mitigate the
burdens of governance reforms. At times, comparing such costs requires
looking at apples and oranges. Will saving administrative expense by
eliminating final prospectus delivery requirements meaningfully offset the
wide-ranging burdens of section 404? It may be that offering costs are not
nearly as intrusive as governance costs; thus, reducing offering regulation
may not do much to counter more governance regulation.
The problem is not limited to comparing reforms in different areas, but
also assessing the effectiveness of each reform on its own terms. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure the costs, benefits and net
effects, of many regulatory changes. Governance reforms have their costs,
but they also have benefits, such as more accurate public company
disclosure, that may make those burdens worthwhile. Offering reforms have
their benefits, but also may result in costs, such as a greater risk of fraud.
Despite this uncertainty, regulators must make choices among different
alternatives. Even if the exact costs are not measurable, judgments can be
made that increased regulation in one area can be mitigated by less
regulation in another area. Even if the costs of reforms cannot be precisely
quantified and compared, over time, regulators should have a sense whether
the system as a whole is working or not. At the very least, looking at
governance and offering regulation together rather than in isolation is a
more sensible way of assessing the effectiveness of the regulatory system.
Linking governance and offerings gives regulators another tool to
understand and assess the regulation of companies offering securities to the
public.
Another objection might be that offsetting the burdens of governance
through offering reform could allow problematic governance rules to
survive. Indeed, if there is a perception that governance regulation can
easily be managed by reducing regulation in other areas, there would be an
incentive to pass further governance proposals. The jury is still out on
whether governance reform will lead to meaningful benefits." If it turns out
that such reforms do not work, regulators should strive to repeal or modify
71 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1803, 1832-36
(2008); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Finn Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002).
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those measures.72 Ideally, both the set of rules regulating (or not regulating)
governance and the set of rules regulating (or not regulating) offerings
should each be as efficient and cost-effective as possible. To the extent that
offering reform dampens efforts to repeal problematic governance rules, the
regulatory system will be second-best or worse.
It may be, though, that under the circumstances, a second-best
regulatory system is all that can be hoped for. There are powerful forces
pushing for greater use of federal law to regulate corporate governance, and
some unwise measures will be passed. The only viable response in some
circumstances might be rear-guard measures that reduce regulatory costs in
other areas. Moreover, some governance measures may, in fact, be
effective. Only the passage of time will tell whether the recent efforts to
regulate governance through the securities laws will be successful. In the
interim, the uncertainty caused by such costs can be managed in part
through thoughtful calibration of the regulatory system.
Finally, thinking of governance and offering regulation as part of one
system suggests an upper limit to governance reforms. Offering reform
cannot forever check the costs of governance reform. To the extent that
more and more governance rules are passed, there will be more and more
pressure to reduce offering regulation. Offering regulation can only be cut
so much without compromising the interests of investors and markets.
Indeed, given that governance regulation can spur less regulation of
offerings, an argument against governance reform is that it will result in
deregulation that harms investors. The JOBS Act in particular has
provisions that have been criticized because they may facilitate fraudulent
schemes. 73 To the extent that the JOBS Act was in part a reaction to the
burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, governance rules have
resulted in less protection for investors. If governance does little to improve
the performance of public companies, and results in dismantling laws that
protect investors, the push to increase federal regulation of corporate
governance will have detrimental effects.
At least in theory, there is some point where the burdens of using the
federal securities laws to regulate corporate governance will be too great.
Governance requirements cannot reach a point where the benefits of
becoming a public company are overwhelmingly outweighed by the costs
of governance. Governance can only be an effective condition of accessing
the public markets if the benefits of such access outweigh the costs.
Whether or not we have reached such a state of affairs is yet to be seen.
72 Another option would be to include sunset provisions in legislation passed
?3ursuant to a financial crisis. See Romano, supra note 2, at 1599-602.
3 See, e.g., Michael Rapoport, In Wake of Groupon Issues, Critics Wary of JOBS
Act, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, the federal securities laws are playing a significant
role in defining the shape of the public corporation. On the one hand,
greater governance is expected of companies that can sell securities to the
public. On the other hand, public offerings are becoming easier for larger
public companies. Any company considering whether to become public will
have to weigh the costs of governance against the benefits of public
offerings. Regulators can adjust regulatory costs in one area to take into
account developments in another area. It is unclear whether the costs
imposed by the first trend will be meaningfully offset by savings from the
second trend. Indeed, there are likely limits to the amount of governance
that can be required of public companies. Already, the trend towards
increasing governance has resulted in pressure to weaken protections for
investors. Regulators should be cognizant of these concerns as they define
the line between public and private companies.
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